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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Timothy Pressley was charged with aggravated battery allegedly committed by 
threatening to do violence by releasing a pit bull breed dog at the alleged victim. The 
jury was instructed that if they found either that Mr. Pressley threated the victim or by 
attempting to commit a violent injury upon the victim, the jury must find him guilty of 
aggravated assault. Because the jury was instructed on a means of committing the 
crime that Mr. Pressley was not put on notice that he would have to defend against, 
there was a fatal variance in the jury instructions. Furthermore, the existence of the 
variance was not harmless and this Court should vacate Mr. Pressley's conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Mr. Pressley by Information with committing felony 
aggravated assault and with misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.26-27.) Specifically, the 
State alleged that Mr. Pressley committed the crime by, 
intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten by word and/or act to 
do violence upon the person of Jeffrey Brekke, by means likely to produce great 
bodily harm, to wit: by releasing a pit bull bread dog at Jeffrey Brekke, which 
created a well-founded fear in Jeffrey Brekke that such violence was imminent. 
(R., p.27.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.48-51.) After the evidence was 
presented and without objection from the defense, the district court instructed the jury 
on the definition of the crime of assault as follows: 
An "assault" is committed when a person: 
(1) unlawfully attempts, with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on 
the person of another; or 
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(2) intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to 
the person of another, with apparent ability to do so, and does some act which 
creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is imminent. 
(R., p.79.) Next, the jury was instructed, 
In order for the defendant to be convicted of the offense charged in Count I, 
the State must prove each of the following: 
(1) On or about September 6, 2012, 
(2) in the State of Idaho, 
(3) the defendant, Timothy Thys Pressley, committed an assault upon 
Jeffrey Brekke, 
(4) by releasing a pit bull bread dog at Jeffrey Brekke, 
(5) the defendant committed the assault by any means or force likely to 
produce great bodily harm. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
(R., p.80.) The jury found Mr. Pressley guilty of both aggravated assault and 
misdemeanor battery. 1 (R., pp.102-103.) The district court sentenced Mr Pressley to a 
unified term of five years, with two and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.105-109.) 
Mr. Pressley filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.113-116.) 
1 In the interests of brevity and clarity, the facts presented at trial will be discussed in 
more detail in section (C)(3) below. 
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ISSUE 
Was Mr. Pressley denied his right to a fair trial by the district court's erroneous 
instructions allowing the jury to convict Mr. Pressley of criminal conduct he was not 
charged with committing? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Pressley Was Denied His Right To A Fair Trial By The District Court's Erroneous 
Instructions Allowing The Jury To Convict Mr. Pressley Of Criminal Conduct He Was 
Not Charged With Committing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Pressley was charged with aggravated battery by threatening to commit 
serious bodily harm. The jury was instructed that they must convict Mr. Pressely of 
aggravated battery if they either found that he threatened serious bodily harm or if they 
found that he attempted to actually cause serious bodily harm. Thus, there exists a 
variance between the crime actually charged and the crimes he actually had to defend 
against. Furthermore, because Mr. Pressley was actually harmed by the variance 
between the information and jury instructions, the variance was fatal and this Court 
should vacate his conviction. 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence 
The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which an 
appellate Court exercises free review. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476,479 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747, 750 (Ct .App. 2003); State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 
56, 57 (Ct. App. 1998).) "A variance may occur where there is a difference between the 
allegations in the charging instrument and the proof adduced at trial or where there is a 
disparity between the allegations in the charging instrument and the jury instructions." 
Id. (citing State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).) A 
variance is fatal if it amounts to a constructive amendment, which occurs if the charging 
document is changed "to the extent the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater 
degree or a different nature." Id. (citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566 (Ct. App. 1993).) Where a statute defines 
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various means of committing a crime, a valid conviction can only be based upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime through the actual 
means charged, rather than through means which exist in the statute but were not 
alleged in the charging document. See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 340 (2011 ). 
C. Mr. Pressley Was Deprived His Right To A Fair Trial Due To A Fatal Variance In 
The Jury Instructions 
Mr. Pressley did not object to the jury instructions in the present case. However, 
he asserts that his claim of a fatal variance can be raised for the first time on appeal 
under the doctrine of fundamental error. In order to obtain relief on appeal under a 
claim of fundamental error the appellant must show the following three things: (1) the 
defendant must demonstrate one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must 
demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the 
trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
1. The District Court's Jury Instructions Contain A Variance From The 
Information Which Deprived Mr. Pressley Of His Constitutional Right To A 
Fair Trial 
A fatal variance is a due process violation and, thus, affects a defendant's 
unwaived, Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995). In the 
present case, the jury instructions allowed Mr. Pressley to be convicted of committing 
criminal activity he was not charged with committing. 
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Idaho Code § 18-901 defines two different ways of committing the crime of 
"assault" as follows: 
An assault is: 
(a) An unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent 
injury on the person of another; or 
(b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the 
person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act 
which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is 
imminent. 
I.C § 18-901. A defendant thus commits an assault if he either attempts to commit a 
violent injury on another (i.e., attempts to commit battery), or threatens to do violence to 
another. 
Mr. Pressley was charged with committing assault by threatening to do harm to 
Mr. Brekke by, 
intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten by word and/or act to 
do violence upon the person of Jeffrey Brekke, by means likely to produce great 
bodily harm, to wit: by releasing a pit bull bread dog at Jeffrey Brekke, which 
created a well-founded fear in Jeffrey Brekke that such violence was imminent. 
(R., p.27.) He was not alleged to have committed the assault through the alternate 
means of actually attempting to harm Mr. Brekke. (R., p.27.) 
The jury instructions, however, required the jury to find Mr Pressley guilty if they 
found either that he threatened to harm Mr. Brekke as charged in the Information, or if 
he attempted to harm Mr. Brekke which was not charged in the Information. The district 
court provided the jury with the following definition of the crime of assault: 
An "assault" is committed when a person: 
(1) unlawfully attempts, with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on 
the person of another; or 
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(2) intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to 
the person of another, with apparent ability to do so, and does some act which 
creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is imminent. 
(R., p.79.) Next, the jury was instructed, 
In order for the defendant to be convicted of the offense charged in Count 
I, the State must prove each of the following: 
(1) On or about September 6, 2012, 
(2) in the State of Idaho, 
(3) the defendant, Timothy Thys Pressley, committed an assault upon Jeffrey 
Brekke, 
(4) by releasing a pit bull bread dog at Jeffrey Brekke, 
(5) the defendant committed the assault by any means or force likely to produce 
great bodily harm. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
(R., p.80 (emphasis added).) The jury instructions informed the jury that they must find 
Mr. Pressley guilty if they found (among other elements) that he committed an "assault" 
on Mr. Brekke. They were provided a definition of "assault" which stated the crime 
occurs either when the defendant "threatens" to harm the victim (as charged), or when 
the defendant "attempts" to harm the victim (not charged). Thus, there exists a variance 
due to a disparity in the language contained in the Information and the language 
contained in the jury instructions. See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (2011 ); State v. 
Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013). 
2. The Error Is Plain On Its Face 
The law is clear that the instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the 
charging document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed 
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the crime charged, and that if they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury 
instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011 ). The 
jury instruction is in the record, so there is no need for additional information outside the 
record to determine whether an error occurred. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was 
a strategic decision. Mr. Pressley gained absolutely no strategic advantage by allowing 
the jury to convict him of uncharged conduct. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that defense counsel recognized the error in the jury instructions but chose not to object 
for any strategic reasons. The Information (which was created and filed by the 
prosecutor), and the jury instructions (which were created and filed by the district court), 
were available not only to Mr. Pressley but to the prosecutor and the district court as 
well. There is simply no reason to believe that counsel for Mr. Pressley recognized the 
variance but did not object to it, while the prosecutor and the district court did not see 
the problem at all. This Court should not speculate to the contrary and should find the 
error plain on its face. See State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 481 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. 
Sutton, 151 Idaho 161 (Ct App. 2011). 
3. The Variance Is Fatal And, Thus, Is Not Harmless 
Although Mr. Pressley generally denied that he released the dog at all, the 
instructions requiring the jury to find Mr. Pressley guilty if they found that he committed 
an assault by attempting to injure Mr. Brekke, coupled with the evidence presented and 
the arguments made by the prosecutor, embarrassed Mr. Pressley in his defense and 
was therefore fatal. Had the jury been properly instructed, there is a reasonable 
probability that Mr. Pressley would have been found not guilty. 
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In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury, "[y]ou will learn ... that on 
September 6th, 2012, Jeffrey Brekke got a different image of a dog. A dog used as a 
weapon. The dog released to attack him and attempt to hurt him ... A dog that was 
released to attack by this man, the defendant, Tim Pressley." (Tr., p.91, Ls.8-18 
(emphasis added).) The prosecutor further argued that the evidence would show that 
after Mr. Pressley released the dog and after Mr. Brekke was able to subdue the dog, 
Mr. Pressley punched Mr. Brekke in the face and, "[t]he evidence and testimony you will 
see today will show that Mr. Pressley became the dog's partner in crime." (Tr., p.94, 
L.12 - p.95, L.20 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor continued, "I will ask you to return 
a verdict reflecting that this defendant committed an aggravated assault against 
Mr. Brekke by releasing his pit bull at him and having him attacked." (Tr., p.96, L.22 -
p.97, L.1 (emphasis added).) 
Mr. Brekke testified that he was the general manager at Travel Centers of 
America in Boise and that he was working on September 6, 2012 where he encountered 
Mr. Pressley, his two traveling companions, and their three dogs, who were sitting 
outside on the grounds of the travel center. (Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.104, L.19.) Mr. Brekke 
approached the three and confronted them about a report that they were involved in 
some sort of altercation, and he told them that there could be no further problems or 
they would be told to leave. (Tr., p.106, L.9 - p.107, L.6.) Mr. Brekke was told that they 
were planning on leaving in the next 10 or 15 minutes, Mr. Brekke went back to work 
inside the store. (Tr., p.107, Ls.6-13.) Later, Mr. Brekke was informed by a customer 
that someone was talking loudly and drinking on the premises, and Mr. Brekke went 
outside to tell Mr. Pressley and his companions to leave. (Tr., p.107, L.23 - p.108, 
L.12.) 
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Having seen a bottle of whiskey sitting near the three, he told them to leave and 
they became boisterous and belligerent. (Tr., p.108, L.13 - p.109, L.5.) Two of the 
dogs barked at Mr. Brekke but he was not too concerned about them, and he told 
Mr.Pressley and his companions to control their dogs. (Tr., p.110, Ls.6-16.) 
Mr. Brekke continued, 
The other dogs continued to circle around me barking, continued asking 
the gentlemen to control their animals. They made no move to do so. I hear the 
pit bull becoming vocal. I look up, he's straining at the leash. Very low guttural 
growls, barks, lunging forward. I look at Mr. Pressley at this time. He raises the 
lead in his hand and opens his hand and the pit bull charges me. 
(Tr., p.111, Ls.2-11.) Mr. Brekke then described his struggle with the pit bull including 
the dog "lunging, jumping, and snapping his jaws" trying to bite him, that the dog 
actually bit him at his side, and that he felt he was in danger of physical harm. 
(Tr., p.112, L.4 - p.113, L.2.) After Mr. Brekke restrained the dog, Mr. Pressley ran 
toward him and punched him in the face. (Tr., p.113, L.3 - p.115, L.25.) The prosecutor 
also asked Mr. Brekke if Mr. Pressley ever made an effort to stop the attack, control the 
dog, or apologize afterword, and Mr. Brekke testified that Mr. Pressley did none of those 
things. (Tr., p.148, L.18 - p.149, L.3.) 
Melvin Savage was fueling his vehicle at the travel center when he heard a 
commotion, looked up, and saw a dog charge Mr. Brekke. (Tr., p.153, L.1 - p.157, L.3.) 
He testified that Mr. Pressley made no effort to restrain the dog, or call the dog off. 
(Tr., p.159, Ls.10-16.) He further testified that after Mr. Brekke subdued the dog, 
Mr. Pressley punched him in the face. (Tr., p.160, Ls.1-23.) Mr. Savage did not hear 
Mr. Pressley apologize and he did not remember if Mr. Pressley ultimately restrained 
the dog. (Tr., p.160, L.17 - p.161, L.9.) 
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Officer Samuel Nesbitt of the Boise Police Department responded to the scene. 
(Tr., p.167, L.14- p.171, L.17.) When he arrived, the pit bull was tied up to a backpack 
with a makeshift leash but it was able to pull towards the officer and jumped on his leg 
and started to nip at him. (Tr., p.174, L.11 - p.175, L.25.) Officer Nesbitt was able to 
get away from the dog but testified that, had he not been able to, he would have shot 
the animal. (Tr., p.175, L.24 - p.177, L.5.) 
Mr. Pressley testified on his own behalf. (Tr., p.198, Ls.1-13.) He testified that 
Roxie, the dog that jumped on Mr. Brekke, belonged to one of his traveling companions 
and that none of the three were holding Roxie's leash when Mr. Brekke confronted them 
and the dog jumped on him. (Tr., p.202, L.4 - p.206, L.21.) Mr. Pressley admitted that 
he overreacted, stating that believed Mr. Brekke was hurting Roxie so he punched him 
in an attempt to protect the dog. (Tr., p.211, L.4 - p.212, L.3.) On cross-examination, 
the prosecutor asked Mr. Pressley if he ever tried to call Roxie back or try to grab his 
leash, to which he replied he did not. (Tr., p.220, L.11 - p.222, L.1.) He also was asked 
whether he could have grabbed Roxie's leash, to which he replied that he could. 
(Tr., p.221, Ls.2-7.) On re-direct, Mr. Pressley testified that Roxie would not have 
responded to his verbal command to stop even if he had done so. (Tr., p.225, Ls.1-16.) 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated, "[t]his dog was an actual 
weapon, a weapon that was released by this defendant to do physical and painful harm 
on Jeff Brekke." (Tr. Closing, p.14, Ls.16-18.) The prosecutor told the jury that there 
was two ways to commit an assault including "[u]nlawful attempt with apparent ability to 
commit a violent injury upon the person of another" and that the evidence showed that 
Mr. Pressley did that by releasing the dog "in an effort to attack him." (Tr. Closing, p.15, 
Ls.7-19.) The prosecutor then argued that there was evidence to support a conviction 
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under the theory that Mr. Pressley threatened Mr. Brekke and stated, "[m]embers of the 
jury, the evidence has shown you, we have it both ways." (Tr. Closing, p.15, L.24 -
p.16, L.15.) The prosecutor told the jury that after the dog started attacking Mr. Brekke, 
Mr. Pressley did not try to help him; rather, he hit him and, "[t]he dog didn't do what he 
wanted it to do, so he was going to finish the job himself." (Tr. Closing, p.21, Ls.12-19.) 
The prosecutor argued that the jury could infer Mr. Pressley's "intent from inaction," 
arguing that his failure to stop the attacked demonstrated that he intended the attack to 
occur. (Tr. Closing, p.22, L.17 - p.23, L.5.) Additionally, the prosecutor argued, 
Members of the jury, on September 12 - or September 6, this defendant 
released the dog he knew was dangerous, he knew was volatile, and at the time 
on September 6th he knew that dog was acting in an aggressive, mean-spirited 
manner. 
It was a pure weapon, and he released that dog. He let that dog go, and 
he let that [dog] attack Jeff Brekke, and he did nothing to stop it. 
(Tr. Closing, p.24, Ls.14-21 (emphasis added).) 
The State presented evidence that Mr. Pressley released the dog, and that he 
did so not just to scare Mr. Brekke, but to actually attack him. Mr. Pressley testified that 
he did not release the dog at all but he acknowledged that did not try to stop the dog 
and he punched Mr. Brekke once the dog was subdued. The State presented additional 
evidence, through the testimony of Mr. Brekke and Mr. Savage, that Mr. Pressley did 
not try to stop the attack once it had begun. The prosecutor argued to the jury that they 
could find that Mr. Pressley committed the aggravated assault either if they found that 
he threatened Mr. Brekke, or if they found that he actually attacked Mr. Brekke, and 
then argued evidence that he failed to stop the dog's attack and his punching 
Mr. Brekke in the face showed that he used the dog as a weapon. 
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Mr. Pressley asserts that the variance in this case is fatal as there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury convicted him of having committed the aggravated 
assault by actually attacking Mr. Brekke, i.e., attempting to batter him, and not by 
merely threatening to do so. The jury could have concluded that Mr. Pressley did not 
actually threaten Mr. Brekke while holding the leash, or even that he ever held the leash 
at all as Mr. Pressley testified, but that his failure to attempt to stop the dog either by 
grabbing the leash or by calling her off demonstrated that he, as the prosecutor 
repeatedly asserted, used the dog as a weapon. Had the jury been properly instructed, 
there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of aggravate 
assault and the variance was fatal. Therefore, Mr. Pressley asserts that this Court must 
vacate his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pressley requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand his case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2014. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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